An Afghanistan hot take before SHTF

Despite claims to the contrary and the understandable Schadenfreude of the Empire’s enemies, the true meaning of Afghan War’s abrupt ending (?) remains hidden.

As always, besides the official narrative there are other possible readings to America’s dramatic evacuation of Afghanistan (at the time of writing still ongoing). It has been much publicized, doubtlessly thanks to spontaneous uploads to social media. Nonetheless, it’s strange that such a shameful display is shown so impudently. Public manifestations of impotence should always be a reason for suspicion.

NATO’s sudden retreat has gone smoothly. Not a shot fired after 20 years of occupation; billions of dollars worth of equipment abandoned in the hands of the Taliban, who now control an Air Force with several helicopters. Televised burning of documents, crisis cabinets, and consternation.

The Empire’s mission on the Middle East for the last two decades had but one objective: to not let the Islamists win. Note, this is very different from actually having NATO not lose, or let alone, win. The point was destabilization of a powerful, motivated, populated and resource-rich area of the world.

A pacified and united Muslim world would be a formidable entity, with tentacles stretching from Morocco to Indonesia. It’s not the problem of a militant Ummah what worries the West (although this is admittedly a true concern for Europeans). It’s just that, geopolitically, a Muslim block stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, driving a common foreign policy, would be hard to subjugate to the will of the Empire. This is not something to be tolerated.

Endemic ethnic and religious strife in the area has been an invaluable asset exploited by the Empire to avoid such an outcome. Worry you not! All the money and lives thrown into that theatre, sufficient to keep the fire alight but never enough to actually control anything, have served their purpose. The holiness of it, though, is another matter.

The humiliation ritual of this week necessarily corresponds to a shift in strategic priorities, and has been in the making for some time. Do you think nobody could see this coming? Anybody who’s been to Afghanistan knew. Concern for the fate of NATO collaborators was already a thing in 2014.

The panic and desperation you see in the news are real, of course. But again, film directors often do not disclose all the plot details with actors, so they can extract from them the most genuine reactions. And Hollywood always makes the best movies.

The hard truth is, the Taliban would always win any protracted conflict that did not involve nuking the country into oblivion. But Afghanistan is not needed as an active hotspot, and the West has had its revenge, so let the Taliban have it.

Such concessions are made to distasteful regimes all the time, in exchange for allegiances. If sodomitic child sex-slavery could be tolerated from Afghan allies, a few summary executions of the collaborators can be forgiven of the Taliban. Nothing personal. Roma traditoribus non praemiat.

Meanwhile, American citizens have been safely evacuated (for the most part). Marines can now go back to their actual job, which is amphibious warfare. Plenty of opportunities in the Caribbean, or, even better, the South China Sea!

And all the equipment lost? Too bad. The Taliban will surely find uses for them. Meanwhile, their substitution will provide and excellent incentive for the Military Industrial Complex to join the next adventure.

Is this cope? Could be, but events in the news are not isolated. They happen within a context that should not be ignored.

A key element of this context is the position of Afghanistan and its history. It has become something of a cliché to mention its landlocked and isolated nature, its artificial origin as a British buffer-State, and its irreductibility against foreign invaders, whether Greek, British, Soviet, or American.

But there are other frameworks to conceive this issue, though; frameworks which are built not around the country’s past and its remoteness, but around its future and its proximity.

Admittedly, Afghanistan represents a primitive vision for the West; a country “living in the Middle Ages” (terribly inappropriate expression if used pejoratively, by the way). A deserted wasteland, populated by illiterate and violent sheperds. The cradle of civilization, trapped in its barbarian state while the world moves on. A restricted reality from which Humanity has thankfully escaped.

This image contrasts with Afghanistan as China’s own Far West. There is an actual, conveniently forgotten land border between both countries, and the Chinese have been quietly extracting resources from there for years. Said border is close to the trade routes between China and Pakistan, which are being developed as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

The Chinese are waging counter-insurgency against Xinjiang Uyghurs, who have often found refuge amongst comrades in Afghanistan. A functional, untrustworthy Taliban government in Afghanistan poses a security threat for them, which is why the Chinese are so eager to woo the new regime.

Central Asia, of which Afghanistan is a core part, is the playing field of the New Great Game between powers. It belongs to China’s version of Manifest Destiny: a portion of its Future, not a relic of its Past. It lays in its New Silk Road towards Europe, and its security is fundamental to China’s ambitions. For them, it is not an embarrassing ancestor, but an untamed heir.

The Taliban are careful in the way they navigate international competition for their barren mountain homeland. In April, the Tehreek e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a Pakistani franchise of the Taliban, car-bombed the hotel where the Chinese Ambassador was staying in Quetta (Pakistan). When claiming authorship, the TTP first said their objective was to kill “Pakistani and foreign officials”; in a follow-up statement, however, they corrected the message and clarified that only Pakistanis were the target. Interesting. What is the meaning of this correction, and who paid for it?

For reasons similar to China’s, Russia is interested in Central Asian security and stability. The Taliban already kicked them out once, and later spent the better part of the 90s helping Chechen and Daguestani insurgents in the Caucasus; the illegal trafficking of opiates is a related persisting problem. This is a lot to manage, and along a wide border. Russia is not closed to accepting allies in their policing of the Eurasian core.

With regard to the economic sphere, infrastructure remaining from previous Russian dominance in Central Asia is proving to be both an opportunity and a burden for countries like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, who are divided between Chinese Belt and Road promises and the security provided by their Russian and Soviet legacy. Whether China and Russia get to see some kind of mutual benefit in cooperating amongst themselves and with the Central Asian countries remains to be seen, and the success of this possibility depends to a certain extent on Afghan participation.

Historically, Afghanistan has been quite reluctant to railroad technology, seeing it as threat to its way of life: imagine what they think of TikTok. Will this change? Despite the war, Afghanistan’s population has doubled to reach 38 million and become increasingly urban since the 1990s, at the height of Taliban power. Perhaps a “pragmatic” relationship between the world and the new government is possible. Maybe these Islamists are aware of the changing realities of their country. Or maybe not.

The smooth transfer of power and Russian acquiescence to it seems striking, compared to the hand-wringing of the very, deeply, strongly, seriously, gravely, extremely, unprecedentedly concerned International Community™. Just like China, Russians are trying to find common ground with the Taliban. Their aim is to protect themselves from the threat they pose. They also hope to recruit the Afghans in confronting US assets in the area (which are not that many to begin with).

In short: all neighbors are now forced to deal with the reality of a well-armed, Taliban-controlled Afghanistan that may or may not go along with their agendas, and who can at any moment turn to seriously threaten their interests. To address the issue, said neighbors may even find themselves having to rely on American help, who can approach the matter from its favored position of foreign financier, knowledgeable advisor and distant ally. A disagreeable dependency, I’m sure; the type enjoyed by the blooming USSR at the beginning of the 20th century, or by early Maoist China.

Was the American pathetic retreat a performance, a planned controlled demolition? When dealing with a faction known for its backstabbing tendencies, perhaps desperation and weakness are shown not by cutting losses, as the American Empire is doing, but by hurriedly trying to achieve securities, guarantees and safeguards.